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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
benefit of the second mortgagee. California 14 and North Dakota 15
have enacted similar legislation.
J. Z.
MORTGAGES-REAL-PERSONAL - "AFTER-AcQUIRED" CLAUSE.
-The plaintiff is the holder by mesne assignments of a first mort-
gage. The defendant is the purchaser of the furnishings of the hotel
which were sold under a chattel mortgage when the owner went into
bankruptcy. The plaintiff instituted proceedings to foreclose the
realty mortgage and claimed that the furniture, furnishings, kitchen
equipment and other contents of the building were subject to the mort-
gage by virtue of a clause contained therein which, after describing
the real property in detail, contained the following clause of coverage:
"together with all fixtures and articles of personal property, now or
hereafter attached to, or used in connection with the premises, all of
which are covered by this mortgage." 1 The building loan mortgage
provided that the loan should be advanced from time to time as the
building progressed. When the final payment was made there was
an outstanding conditional sales contract on file embracing furniture.
Subsequently, a chattel mortgage upon the furnishings and movables
was executed and delivered by the owner. On appeal from a judg-
ment for plaintiff, held, reversed. The facts and circumstances with
respect to the personal property in controversy do not justify a con-
clusion that it was included within the terms of the mortgage. Manu-
facturers Trust Company v. Peck-Schwartz Realty Corporation, et al.,
277 N. Y. 283, 14 N. E. (2d) 70 (1938).
The movables in the instant case would come within the terms
of the coverage clause: (1) if they became fixtures 2 as a matter of
146 Miss. 1, 111 So. 448 (1927) (the mortgagor repurchased foreclosed prop-
erty from the grantee of buyer at foreclosure sale).
" CAL. CIv. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 2930.
'N. D. ComP. LAWS (1913-25) §6731. Both California (see note 14,
supra) and North Dakota have enacted that "title acquired by the mortgagor
subsequent to the execution of the mortgage inures to the mortgagee as security
for the debt in like manner as if acquired before the execution." It has been
interpreted to apply to cases where the mortgagor had title, lost it, and sub-
sequently reacquired title, as much as to cases where the mortgagor not having
title at first acquired it subsequent to the mortgage. Jensen v. Duke, 71 Cal.
App. 210, 234 Pac. 876 (1925) ; Merchants National Bank of Fargo v. Miller,
59 N. D. 273, 229 N. W. 357 (1930).
1 This is the same clause as the one read into a mortgage by statute except
that the words "now or hereafter" and "all of which are covered by this mort-
gage" are not included in the statutory form. N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254,
subd. 1, Cons. Laws, c. 50.
'Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344 (1859). A fixture is a thing permanent in its
nature which has lost the character of personal property and has become a part
of a definite parcel of land by permanent annexation. Whether the thing has
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law; (2) if they became part of the realty so as to be essential to its
support; 3 (3) if there were an express agreement that they shall be-
come part and parcel of the mortgaged realty; 4 (4) if there were no
such express agreement but it clearly appeared from all the facts that
the intent was to make them part of the security for the loan.5 In
the case at bar the movables did not fall within any of the above
groups. No mention of furniture was made in the application for
the loan; there was no stipulation in the mortgage for fire insurance
on the furniture; the final payment was made on the loan even though
there was an outstanding conditional sales contract on the furniture;
and when the owner went into bankruptcy the chattels were sold under
the chattel mortgage, and at no time during these proceedings did the
plaintiff assert any title to the movables. 6 When an owner of real
property affixes a fixture to his land or building, having purchased it
under a contract of conditional sale or where he gives back a chattel
mortgage to secure the purchase price, title to th~e fixture although
it passes to the purchaser in the latter case, simultaneously reverts to
the seller.7 It is well settled in most jurisdictions that the chattel
mortgage or conditional sales contract covering fixtures is valid and
enforceable as against a prior real estate mortgagee even though the
mortgage contained an "after-acquired" personalty clause. The fix-
ture does not become part of the land, in fact or law, since title is
not in the owner of the land.3 The real estate mortgagee can claim
become permanently annexed or not is a question of fact which must be decided
according to the facts of each case. The test by which permanency of annexa-
tion is determined.is the intent with which the annexation is made and the
adaptability of the thing annexed to permanent use as part of the land. See
note 7, infra.
'Tift v. Horton, 53 N. Y. 377 (1873) (this would be true if no such clause
existed).
'Shelton Holding Corp. v. 150 East 48th St. Corp., 264 N. Y. 339, 346,
191 N. E. 8 (1934).5 Alf. Holding Corp. v. American Stove Co., 253 N. Y. 450, 452, 171 N. E.
703 (1930). In this case the plaintiff had a contract with a conditional vendee
whereby the latter was to complete the building and finish it "in a fashion
similar to buildings of the same type in said location". There is no denial that
fulfillment of that covenant made it necessary to supply the building with ranges
and like fittings without which apartments of that order would be unsuitable for
tenants. Cf. Tift v. Horton, 53 N. Y. 377 (1873) ; Shelton Holding Corp. v.
150 East 48th St. Corp., 246 N. Y. 339, 191 N. E. 8 (1934).
" In a case with a factual situation precisely the same as the one in the case
at bar, it was held that a mortgage on premises "and personal property attached
to or used in connection with" given to secure a building loan did not include
pianos, billiard tables, chairs, carpets, linens, utensils, furniture, or equipment
of a fraternal club purchased on a conditional bill of sale, where the mortgagee
was required to advance a stipulated amount regardless of furnishings and the
prospectus offering certificates in the mortgage for sale, and fire insurance
procured by the mortgagee, described the real estate only. Ex parte Benevolent
Protective Order of Elks Brooklyn Lodge No. 22 Manufacturers Trust Co. v.
Bachrich No. 235, 69 F. (2d) 816 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
" WALSH, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1927) § 46.
'There is an exception to this rule where the chattel replaces an article of
personalty already under the lien of the mortgage. The replacement impairs
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no equity arising out of estoppel since the fixture was not annexed
when he accepted the land as security and he was not misled in any
way.9 It is also uniformly held that a chattel mortgage or contract of
conditional sale is good as against a subsequent mortgagee with no-
tice. 10 It is often vital to the security of a real estate mortgage that
items of personalty such as refrigerators, gas ranges, etc., be covered
thereby. The parties to a mortgage agreement are allowed the utmost
freedom of contract subject to certain well defined limitations, and
they may, therefore, provide that articles of personal property will
be covered thereby. The question presented, however, is the extent
to which the courts will construe the broad clause referred to above
or how far they will go in allowing the clause to include such items
of personal property not so attached to the realty as to become fixtures,
but which are purported to be covered thereby.
In the absence of intervening equities, the words contained in
the statutory clause " do not necessarily bring within the coverage of
the mortgage, movables which are not so attached to the realty as to
become fixtures, and the expressions "now or hereafter" and "all of
which are covered by this mortgage" added to the statutory form, do
not, in and of themselves, extend the coverage. 12 The clause will in-
clude gas ranges, title to which is in the owner of the property and
which are attached to the building when the mortgage is made and
recorded,' 3 but such a clause will not ordinarily include personal
the security of the mortgage and for that reason the conditional sale vendor's
lien is subordinate to the lien of the real estate mortgage. This would not be
true, however, if the conditional vendor could prove that the article replaced
was without value. Roche v. Thurber, 272 N. Y. 582, 4 N. E. (2d) 814 (1936).
'Tift v. Horton, 53 N. Y. 377 (1873), holding that where chattels are
annexed to real estate with the intent that they shall not thereby become part
of the freehold, as a general rule the intent will control without any concurrent
intention of the prior mortgagees.
10 Salt kettles were brought and mortgaged to the seller as personalty.
They were imbedded in brick arches, but could be removed without injury to
them by displacing a portion of the brick at inconsiderable expense; and the
course of the manufacture required them to be thus removed and reset annually:
held, that they continued to be personalty as against a subsequent purchaser of
the salt works, who had no notice of the facts, other than constructively from
the filing of the chattel mortgage. Ford v. Cobb, 20 N. Y. 344 (1859).
See note 1, supra.
The words "hereafter attached to" do not include lighting fixtures lying
loose and unattached in the various rooms of the building. "This mortgage did
not amount to a full and complete chattel mortgage so as to cover personal
property delivered to and in possession of the vendee but not yet attached to the
real estate." Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 259 N. Y. 343,
182 N. E. 10 (1932).
"Cohen v. 1165 Fulton Ave. Corp., 251 N. Y. 24, 166 N. E. 792 (1929).
The lien of a mortgage which, after describing the property covered continues
"together with all fixtures and articles of personalty now or hereafter attached
to or used in connection with the premises all of which are covered by this
mortgage", attaches to gas ranges sold under a conditional sales contract and
attached to the premises where the mortgage was taken without knowledge of
the reservation of title.
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property not in existence at the time the mortgage was made and
recorded.
1 4
In the instant case it was held that there was no express agree-
ment that the personalty should become part of the realty and that
the facts did not indicate such an intent. But quaere, what if it did
affirmatively appear from the facts and circumstances that the maker
of the mortgage intended that the after-acquired personalty should be
deemed within the coverage of the mortgage, and it was then pur-
chased under a conditional sales contract or a chattel mortgage? The
result would be the same. The mortgagor's intention could not affect
the rights of the conditional vendor which would be prior to the rights
of the first mortgagee, because title to the chattels would still be in the
conditional vendor and not in the owner of the property. The mort-
gagor could not mortgage property he did not own. It would appear,
however, that the mortgage under these circumstances would cover
the owner's equity in the chattels and upon satisfaction of the condi-
tional sales contract or chattel mortgage, the personalty would come
within the coverage of the mortgage in equity.15
F. D. M.
SALEs - BREACH OF WARRANTY - DEATH ACTION UNDER
DECEDENT ESTATE LAW SECTION 130.-An action was brought to
recover for the wrongful death of plaintiff's wife. The defendant
offered provisions and foodstuffs for sale to the public as part of its
retail business. Among said foodstuffs were pork frankfurters or
sausages, a quantity of which the deceased purchased and consumed,
contracting therefrom the disease of trichinosis, of which she died.
The plaintiff sought recovery on the theory of breach of the implied
warranty of fitness for use. Held, breach of the implied warranty
that the food was fit for human consumption was such a "default" or
"wrongful act" as to bring the case within the purview of Section 130
"' Prudential Insurance Co. v. Sanford Real Estate Corp., 157 Misc. 563,
284 N. Y. Supp. 73 (1935), af'd, 246 App. Div. 567, 282 N. Y. Supp. 840 (4th
Dept. 1935). The mortgage is subject to the construction enjoined by statute
(REAL PROP. LAW § 54) notwithstanding that it contains, in addition to the
words of the statutory form, other provisions. Property not on the premises
when the mortgage was given could not be covered by the mortgage unless it
became a part of the realty. The mortgage could not cover personal property
not then in existence. Cf. Perfect Lighting Fixtures Co. v. Grubar Realty
Corp., 228 App. Div. 141, 239 N. Y. Supp. 286 (1st Dept. 1930).
' Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N. Y. 519, 24 N. E. 811 (1890); Rochester v.
Rasey, 142 N. Y. 570, 37 N. E. 632 (1894).
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